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GOVERNMENT TAKINGS
US. Const. amend V-
INlor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation
N.Y Const. art. 1, § 7.
Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DMSION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Vinciguerra v. New York'
(decided June 10, 1999)
Claimants commenced this action against the State of New York
seeking damages for trespass,2 de facto appropriation3 and prima
facie tort' after discovering that a state- constructed headwall and
' 693 N.Y.S.2d 634.
2 Id at 636. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines trespass as "an unauthorized
intrusion or invasion of private premises or land of another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1044 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). For state constitutional takings
purposes, there is a mere trespass, and not a taking "where the interference with
property rights is only temporary, casual or intermittent, without any permanent
use or appropriation or destruction of an existing right.... " See Stewart v.
State of New York, 248 A.D.2d 761, 762, 669 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (3d Dep't
1998) (quoting 51 N.Y. JUR. 2D, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 88).
3 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636. "[D]e facto appropriation, in the context
of a physical invasion, is based on showing that the government has intruded
onto the citizen's property and interfered with the owner's property rights to
such a degree that the conduct amounts to a constitutional taking requiring the
government to purchase the property from the owner... ." O'Brien v. City of
Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1160, 445 N.Y.S2d 687, 689
(1981).
4 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines prima
facie tort as the "infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without
1
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culvert encroached two to two and one-half feet onto their
property.' The headwall and culvert were constructed in 1948 by
the State as part of a drainage system for a nearby roadway.6 As a
result of the drainage system, water was intermittently directed
.across the claimants' property.7  Claimants filed suit seeking
damages from the State as a result of the State's occupation of and
interference with their property.' Both Article I, Section 7 of the
New York State Constitution9 and the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution"0 bar the state from taking private
property for public use without just compensation." Under New
York State law, a de facto appropriation of private property by the
State constitutes a constitutional taking."
The Court of Claims dismissed the claim for prima facie tort and
found that the actions of the state amounted to a de facto
appropriation, not a trespass.' However, because the Court of
Claims found the statute of limitations for de facto appropriation to
excuse or justification, by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be
lawful." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 826 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
5 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
6 Id.
8 id.
9 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). The New York State Constitution states in
pertinent part: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." Id.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The United States Constitution states in pertinent
part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Id.
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
2 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see generally City of Buffalo v.
J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971);
O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d
687 (1981); Stewart v. State of New York, 248 A.D.2d 761, 669 N.Y.S.2d 723
(3d Dep't 1998).
13 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
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be long expired, it dismissed the claimant's action.'4  The
Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal under a
different legal and factual analysis.'" The Appellate Court held
that although the head wall and culvert hampered and complicated
claimants' development plans, the State's intrusion was not "so
egregious as to constitute a constitutional taking."' 6
In contemplation of constructing a strip mall, claimants
purchased eight vacant undeveloped plots of land in a series of five
transactions between January 1973 and November 1990.17 In
1989, during excavation of the property, claimants discovered a
drainage system, consisting of a culvert and headwall, encroaching
upon two to two and one-half feet of their property." Claimants
later discovered that these structures were constructed by the State
as part of a 1948 drainage project for a nearby roadway.'9 As a
result of the drainage, a stream of water was intermittently directed
across claimants' land and eventually engulfed the headwall and
culvert making the structures difficult to see.2° After discovering
the encroachment, claimants demanded that the state redirect the
" Id The statute of limitations for claims against the state for de facto
appropriation is three years. See Stewart v. State of New York, 248 A.D.2d 761,
669 N.Y.S.2d 723 (3d Dep't 1998).
1 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The Court of Claims found the intrusion
upon claimants' property to be a de facto appropriation, but dismissed the claim
because the statute of limitations for such appropriation had run. However, the
Appellate Division found no de facto appropriation, but instead found the state's
actions amounted to a continuing trespass. Id at 637. However, the Appellate
Division found that any action claimants may have had under trespass was
barred because the state had acquired a prescriptive easement across claimants'
property for the drainage system. Id at 638.
16 Id at 637.
17 Id at 636.
Is Id
19 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
11 Id Although claimants contended that they never noticed the headwall and
culvert before 1989 because a stream of water flowed over and covered the
structures, the court noted that it was undisputed that claimants never surveyed
the lots prior to purchase. Id In addition, it was undisputed that claimants were
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waters.2  However, the state declined to do so' and claimants
commenced an action seeking damages for trespass, de facto
appropriation, and prima facie tort.' Following a trial, the Court
of Claims dismissed the action finding that the State's action
amrunted to ,a de facto appropriation for which .the. statute of
limitations had long expired.24
After factually assessing whether the Court of Claims' judgment
was warranted by the evidence, the Appellate Division concluded
that the State's action did not constitute a de facto appropriation.'
The Appellate Court found that, although the head wall and culvert
had encroached upon claimants' property since at least 1948,
acting as an intermittent water drainage for a state highway, the
structures and their resulting runoff, at most, complicated and
hampered their development plans.26 In the Appellate Court's
view, the complications claimants suffered due to the existence of
these permanent structures and their resulting runoff did not rise to
the level of a constitutional taking. 7 Instead, the Appellate Court
found that the two and one-half foot encroachment amounted to a
continuing trespass by the State.2" However, the Appellate Court
concluded that the claimants' cause of action for trespass was
21 id
2 Id. The state contended that the "drainage system had been in uninterrupted
use since approximately 1908, thereby giving it a prescriptive drainage easement
burdening the property." Id. In order to establish an easement by prescription,
the state would have to show by "clear and convincing evidence the adverse,
open and notorious, continued and uninterrupted use of [the claimants] property
for the prescriptive period of 10 years." Duke v. Sommer, 205 A.D.2d 1009,
1010, 613 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (3d Dep't 1994).
23 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
24 id
25 Id.
26 Id. at 637.
27 Id
28 Vinciguerra, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 637. In assessing "whether the intrusion
amounted to a continuing trespass," the court concluded that any action for
trespass was barred by "expiration of sufficient time to create an easement by
prescription" in the state. As a result, claimants' cause of action for continuing
trespass had expired. Id.
[Vol 16
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barred because the State had established a prescriptive easement
over the property.2 9
The New York State Constitution bars the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.O° Under New
York law, when the State's physical intrusion upon private
property amounts to such an aggravated form of trespass as to
constitute a de facto appropriation, a constitutional taking has
occurred and the State will be required to purchase the property
from the private owner.3 A de facto appropriation is distinguished
from a trespass by the egregiousness of the interference with the
owner's property rights.3" Where there is merely a casual or
temporary interference, without any permanent use, the resulting
appropriation or destruction of private property rights is merely a
trespass. 33 However, when the alleged trespasser is the State and
the intrusion permanently interferes with the property owner's
"'physical use, possession and enjoyment of [the land]', the State's
action constitutes a de facto taking."M Once there is a finding of
29 Id at 638. The court found that the drainage of water and "construction of
the headwall and culvert were adverse to the interests of claimants' and both
continuous and uninterrupted ... for the prescriptive period." Id In addition,
the fact that the structures were visible during dry periods and inundated with
water during wet periods, coupled with the fact that claimants admitted they
never thoroughly inspected the ditch, and "did not have the property surveyed
before their purchase," supports the conclusion that the State's infringement on
the property was open and notorious. Id Therefore, knowledge of the intrusion
was imputed to the claimants, resulting in a prescriptive easement. See id. at
637-38.
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31 See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 429 N.E.2d 1158,
1160,445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981).
3 See Stewart v. State of New York, 248 A.D.2d 761, 762, 669 N.Y.S.2d
723, 724 (3d Dep't 1998).
3 Stewart, 248 A.D.2d at 762, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
3 Id (quoting Hyland Flying Serv. v. State of New York, 54 A.D.2d 278, 388
N.Y.S.2d 444 (4' Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed 40 N.Y. 2d 809, 360 N.E.2d
1109, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1977)). In order for the courts to find a de facto
taking, there must be a "physical entry by the condemnor, a physical ouster of
the owner, a legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoyment of
the property or a legal interference with the owner's power of disposition of the
property." City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement, 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255, 269 N.E.2d
895, 903, 321 N.Y.S2d 345, 357 (1971).
2000
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de facto appropriation, a constitutional taking has occurred and the
State must pay just compensation. 5
Although the Appellate Court did not discuss the Federal
Constitutional issue, both the Federal and New York State
Constitutionsz~uire the -government. to pay just 'compensation
when private property is taken for public use.36 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., J Justice Marshall
discussed, in some detail, the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the "Takings Clause" of the fifth amendment
when there has been a physical occupation of private property by
the government.38 Justice Marshall began by tracing the history of
physical takings under the U.S. Constitution and pointing out that,
as far back as 1872, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.," the Supreme
Court held that physical occupation of another's property is a
constitutional taking.' In Pumpelly, the Court held, "where real
estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water,
earth, sand, or other material, or by having an artificial structure
placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it
is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution."' The Loretto
court demonstrates that since 1871, the U.S. Supreme Court has
considered a physical appropriation of private property to be the
most serious interference with a landowner's property rights under
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.4"
3- See O'Brien 54 N.Y.2d at 357, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687,
689 (1981).
36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
37 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
38 id.
39 80 U.S. 166 (1871). Petitioner brought suit against the Green Bay and
Mississippi Canal Company for flooding 640 acres of his land due to the
construction of a damn, authorized by statute and built in conformity therewith,
across the Fox River. Id
40 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.
41 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181.
42 See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419,429 (1982).
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Furthermore, Supreme Court cases establish that a taking occurs
when the government's actions amount to a permanent physical
occupation of the property. 3 The Supreme Court has routinely
distinguished between cases where government action causes a
physical occupation of the property and cases where the invasion is
only temporary in character or is caused by government action
beyond the property line that results in consequential damages to
the property.' Only when the Court determines that a permanent
physical occupation has occurred will a constitutional taking be
found.4' Once the Court finds that a physical intrusion of the
property has reached the level of a permanent occupation, a taking
will be found regardless of how insubstantial the size of the
property or of the physical interference with the owner's use and
enjoyment of the rest of the land. 6 Consequently, the Loretto
Court's review of the Supreme Court takings cases revealed that,
although a physical taking is subject to a balancing test,' it appears
that a permanent physical occupation will never be exempt from
classification as a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.'
In conclusion, a takings claim is likely to succeed under the
Federal and New York constitutional standards when the
government's actions amount to a permanent physical occupation
of the claimant's property. Consequently, a temporary or
intermittent intrusion upon one's property will not amount to a
13 Id at 426 (stating that once "the physical intrusion reaches the extreme
form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such case,
'the character of the government action' not only is an important factor in
resolving whether the action works a taking but is also determinative.").
44 Id at 428.
45 Id
I Id (stating "constitutional protection for the rights of private property
cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied").
47 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432. In resolving whether government action results in
a taking the court will weigh the economic impact of the occupation on the
property owner, "the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action." Id See generally
Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432.
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